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Abstract
The hypothesis that pragmatic inferences presented in text are taken for
granted, superficially processed, and not stably or enduringly represented
in memory was investigated. Stories were read which in some conditions con-
tained information vitiating the implicational force of explicit inferences.
The vitiating information was presented either before or after the inferences.
In Experiment I, errors in memory for the inferences were prevalent in the
"after" but not the "before" condition. Two kinds of errors were made:
saying the inference had not been presented in the story; or, if it was
remembered as having been presented, altering the specific content of the
inference to produce the opposite of what was actually presented. The latter
errors produced coherence with the vitiating information, and subjects were
not able to differentiate these errors from correct responses. In Experiment
II, the results of Experiment I were replicated, and a "spontaneous correction"
interpretation was rejected. The results of both experiments combine to sup-
port the hypothesis of superficial processing and unstable representation of
explicit inferences. The results provide a link between processes occurring
at comprehension and recall in the State of Schema model of accommodative
reconstruction.
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Language is characterized by considerable semantic predictability.
Explicitly presented information may be logically or probabilistically im-
plied by earlier parts of a discourse. How is such information processed
and stored? The view typically espoused in discourse processing and rep-
resentation theories is that all presented information, including inferences,
receives sufficient processing to be encoded in long-term memory (e.g.,
Anderson & Bower, 1973; Fredericksen, 1975; Kintsch, 1974; Meyer, 1974).
For example, Kintsch assumes "that subjects process and store [an inference]
whether or not it is presented explicitly" (p. 154). This view will be
referred to as the "storage of presented inferences" (SPI) hypothesis.
An alternative hypothesis is that predictable information, however
central to a discourse, is taken for granted, processed only superficially
and receives an attenuated cognitive representation or no enduring repre-
sentation at all. This view will be referred to as the"superficial processing
of presented inferences" (SPPI) hypothesis. It is important to determine
which of these hypotheses is correct for several reasons. Obviously, the
issue is basic for any discourse processing or representation model. Addi-
tionally, the SPPI hypothesis is a crucial link in a theory of accommodative
reconstruction processes in memory for discourse (Spiro, 1977).
Spiro (Note 1) found a pervasive tendency for subjects to produce
predictable meaning-changing distortions and importations in text recall
under certain conditions. In general, when subsequently encountered in-
formation contradicted continuation expectations derived from a target
story, the story frequently was reconstructed in such a way as to reconcile
or cohere with the continuation information. This process of inferring
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the past based on the present was termed accommodative reconstruction.
After a long retention interval, subjects tended to be more confident that
their accommodative recall errors had actually been included in the story
than they were confident about the accurate aspects of their recall. Why
should such gross errors occur and then be assigned such high confidence?
Part of the answer surely involves their function in producing coherence.
Still, it is somewhat surprising that subjects should be so sure they read
information that bore not even a distant inferential relationship to what
they actually did read.
Spiro (1977) suggested that the basis for such an effect may be in
the way inferentially related information is treated at the time of compre-
hension. If the SPPI hypothesis is correct, individuals should know (at
least tacitly) that considerable amounts of predictable or derivable infor-
mation they have encountered will not be available in memory. In that case,
recall would typically involve deriving a lot of missing information. Ac-
cordingly, it would not be surprising that subjects faced with memories that
lack coherence would assume that missing reconciling information was presented
but only superficially processed at comprehension. The information could
then be derived at recall with high confidence. Hence the capacity for
restructuring the past based on the present.
The present experiments were designed to test the SPPI hypothesis.
Stories were presented which contained information A, B, and C such that
B was strongly implied by A except in the presence of C. For example,
the A, B, and C elements in one story (about a demonstration by a karate
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champion) could be paraphrased as follows:
A: The karate champion hit the block
B: The block broke
C: He had had a fight with his wife earlier. It was impairing
his concentration. He doesn't perform as well when he can't
concetrate.
C is either presented prior to A and B (C-Before), after A arid B (C-After),
or not at all (No-C). When C is not included in the story, if SPPI is correct,
the B element would be taken for granted, processed only superficially, and
not stably represented. It would be derivable if needed. However, if C is
presented after A and B, memory for B should be impaired since B was not stored
and C will block its derivation from A at the time of test. On the other
hand, if C occurs in the text prior to A and B, then B is not strongly im-
plied by A. B cannot be taken for granted with the assumption that it can be
generated later if needed. Here B should be stably represented and memory
for B should not be impaired.
However, if SPI is correct, memory for B should not be affected by
whether C is before or after A and B, since B is stored whether it is implied
by A (C-After) or not implied by A (C-Before). Two objections to this argu-
ment can be made. The information might be stored, but remembering C might
lead to a decision that the memory for B must be mistaken (a kind of output
interference). However, C is present whether it occurs before or after A
and B, so such an explanation would not account for differential effects of
C-placement. The other possibility is that B is represented in C-After, but
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the representation is altered or corrected when the C information is encoun-
tered. This possibility will be investaged in Experiment II.
In the first experiment, the following predictions of the SPPI hypothesis
were tested. More errors in response to questions about the presented im-
plied information (B) should be made in the C-After than in the C-Before
conditions. Errors can be erroneous judgments that nothing about the im-
plied information was presented, called B-Mention errors (e.g., the story did
not mention whether the block was broken), or, when the subject believes that
something about B was mentioned, remembering incorrectly what was specifically
said in the direction of conforming with the C information, called B-Incorrect
errors (e.g., it said in the story that the block did not break when he hit
it). Confidence in errors of the latter kind will also be analyzed. If
subjects are as confident about these errors as they are about their accurate
responses, it would be even more difficult to maintain the hypothesis that
the implied information was represented.
In the No-C condition, B-Mention errors may occur since B would not be
represented according to the SPPI hypothesis. The more important prediction
regarding the No-C condition is that B-Incorrect errors should not occur more
often than in the C-Before condition. Otherwise, the differences between
C-Before and C-After might be attributable to heightened accuracy due to
greater salience of the implied information in the former condition rather
than greater inaccuracy due to a failure to store the implied information in
the latter condition.
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Experiment I
Method
Subjects. Twenty students in an introductory educational psychology
class at the University of Illinois served as subjects. Participation in the
experiment partially fulfilled a course requirement.
Materials. A 24 page booklet entitled, "What Became of the Old Class-
mates?" was constructed. The story featured eleven character vignettes of
approximately 250 words each. Three of the vignettes were used as unanalyzed
buffers, one at the beginning of the book and two at the end. Also, there was
an introductory page which said the vignettes would describe events involving
several old classmates who had gone their individual ways and were now being
observed several years after graduation. The other eight vignettes contained
the target information for the study. Each vignette contained information,
A and B, such that A pragmatically implied B. The vignettes also contained
information, C, which lessened the extent to which B was implied by A (see
the karate champion example presented earlier). In one condition,C was pre-
sented after A and B (C-After condition). In another, C was presented be-
fore A and B (C-Before condition). Each vignette was presented on two pages
with C always on a separate page from A and B. In a third condition, there
was no C information (No-C condition). Booklets were constructed in such
a way that there were two random orderings of the eight experimental pas-
sages.
A test booklet was constructed which contained 7 questions for each of
the vignettes. The order of the sets of questions in the booklets was the
same as the order of the vignettes which each subject received. The set
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of questions for each vignette was introduced by the character's name and
a brief description (e.g., "Steve: the passage about the karate champion").
The first question in each set asked whether any B information had been
mentioned (e.g., "Did it say in the story whether or not the block broke
when he hit it?"). These will be referred to as B-Mention questions.
Remember that B was always mentioned. The second question had the following
form: "If you answered the last question 'no' do not answer this question.
If you answered 'yes', did it say X in the story?" For the karate champion
example, X was "The block did not break." The questions were phrased so that
"yes" and "no" responses were correct equally often. The subjects answered
and rated the certainty of their response on a six-point scale. Errors on
the second question will be called B-Incorrect responses. The next two
questions had the same format as the two just described. These dealt with
some other arbitrarily chosen information given in the vignette. The fifth
and sixth questions called for subjects to make a judgment about the char-
acter's popularity and academic success in high school. These questions were
intended to help mask the true intentions of the experiment. The seventh
question elicited recall of the C information (e.g., "What was Steve's prob-
lem the day of the demonstration?").
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to conditions and were run in groups of
four or less. There were four subjects in the C-Before and C-After conditions
and eight subjects in the No-C condition. The same investigator tested all
subjects. An instruction sheet was passed out, and subjects were told to
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read it silently while the investigator read it aloud to them. The instruc-
tions were as follows:
You will read a story. Following the completion of the story, you will
be asked some questions about it. One kind of question you will be asked
will involve your personal reactions to the characters in the story as
they are described in various vignettes.
A crucial aspect of this study is that we are interested only
in your first reactions, rather than your reactions after you've
taken time to think about what you've read. Accordingly, we will ask
that you read as quickly as possible and that once you turn a page
you never look back at the preceding pages. However, be sure to
understand all that you read, or you will be unable to answer some
of the questions. Read and understand. Simply do it as quickly as is
reasonable.
Also, one again, to ensure rapid progress and to ensure that
your first reactions aren't re-evaluated, never turn back to pre-
viously completed pages!
Subjects were allowed nine minutes to read the story. To ensure that subjects
had sufficient time to complete the target passages, subjects were instructed
to circle the last word read when time was called. All subjects finished
the target passages. The question booklet was then distributed and the ex-
perimenter worked through with them the first set of questions (which dealt
with a buffer passage). Subjects were instructed to work through the ques-
tions in order, to answer every question, and not to change any answers
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after they were written. They were allowed sufficient time to complete the
questions.
Results
There were no significant effects involving list order. Accordingly,
all analyses are collapsed across lists.
Two kinds of errors could be made: saying B was not mentioned (B-Men-
tion errors) and saying B was mentioned but responding with the incorrect
specifics (B-Incorrect errors). Combining both types of errors, signif-
icantly more errors were made in the C-After than in the C-Before condition,
t(18) = 2.37, p < .015 (means and standard deviations are presented in
Table I).
Insert Table 1 about here
In this and all other analyses where significant differences are reported,
the trends were in the same direction for each of the eight passages. Group
differences accounted for 23.7% of the variance. More B-Mention errors were
made in C-After than in C-Before (see Table 1), but the difference was non-
significant. Although the incidence of B-Mention errors in the No-C con-
dition was not of particular interest, the high proportion of such errors
provides an indication that the implied informationwas not directly stored.
In the most important analysis, the conditional probability of a B-Incorrect
error given that B-Mention was correct was significantly higher for C-After
than C-Before or No-C, F(2,25) = 4.48, p < .025. The probability of this
type of error was significantly higher (. < .05 in each Newman-Keuls
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comparison) for C-After than for the other two conditions, which did not
differ from each other. Group differences accounted for 26.4% of the
variance.
B-Incorrect errors for C-After indicate that the predictable informa-
tion is superficially processed and not stably represented. The question
remains whether these errors are guesses or the result of a natural and
undetectable accommodative process of reconstruction of the past based on
incomplete memorial data (Spiro, Note 1, 1977). If subjects are able to
detect their errors, as indicated by their confidence ratings, the guessing
interpretation would be supported. If not, that would suggest the operation
of accommodative reconstruction. On the filler questions unrelated to the
experimental manipulation, subjects were able to detect their errors. For
subjects who made the equivalent of B-Incorrect errors on the fillers, con-
fidence was significantly higher for correct responses (M = 5.19; SD = .823)
than for incorrect responses (M = 4.49; SD = .996), t(16) = 2.38, p < .015.
However, for the B information in the C-After condition, confidence when
correct (M = 5.37; SD = .586), did not differ significantly from confidence
in B-Incorrect errors (M = 5.06; SD = 1.32), t(7) < 1. For the eight C-After
subjects who made B-Incorrect errors, four had higher mean confidence when
B was correct, three had higher mean confidence when B was incorrect, and
there was one tie. For these eight subjects, only one was better able to
detect their B-incorrect errors than their errors on the filler questions, as
indicated by comparison of average confidence when correct minus confidence
when incorrect for the two kinds of questions (p < .04 in a one-tailed sign
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test). The confidence analyses support the accommodative reconstruction
interpretation of B-Incorrect errors over the guessing interpretation.
Finally, there were no differences among the groups in combined error
frequency on the filler items, F < 1 (means of 2.6, 2.7, and 2.5 for the
C-After, C-Before, and No-C conditions, respectively).
Discussion
The results support the hypothesis that pragmatic inferences presented
in text are superficially processed and do not receive a stable and enduring
representation in memory. In the C-After condition, subjects tended either
to report that the inference was not presented in the text or that the op-
posite of the inference was presented. It is difficult to retain the notion
that inferences are deeply processed and stably encoded when the C-After
manipulation can produce errors like remembering the block was not broken
when the karate champion hit it. The results cannot be attributed to inter-
ference produced by the inference-vitiating C information at output, since
the C-Before subjects would also be subject to such interference. Neither
can the results be attributed to differential availability of C at output,
perhaps due to primacy/recency effects related to the position of C in the
text, since the information was almost always recalled. Also, unimportance
of the B information is not a viable alternative since B tended to be central
to the story (e.g., in a story about a karate champion's performance, informa-
tion about his success in the demonstration is certainly important). If one
were to argue that B is less important structurally because it is predictable,
that is a novel conception of importance. This issue will be addressed in
the General Discussion.
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One interpretation that remains as a viable alternative is that sub-
jects do deeply process and stably encode the presented inferences, but
"correct" their representation when the inference-vitiating information
is presented. The second experiment tested this hypothesis.
Experiment II
If subjects are storing B and then changing or correcting it at the
time C is presented, errors on B should occur in the C-After condition no
matter how soon the test is administered after reading. However, if the
SPPI hypothesis is correct, when delay intervals are brief enough some surface
memory for the superficially processed B information may remain, reducing
the number of B errors. Accordingly, in this experiment subjects were tested
either immediately after reading each story (Interspersed Questions condition)
or, as in Experiment I, after the entire set of stories had been read (Ques-
tions-After condition). Again, the C-Before and C-After manipulations were
employed.
Method
Twenty-four subjects from the same subject pool and participating for
the same inducements as in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to one of
the eight between-subject cells determined by factorial combination of the
two levels of C-placement, the two levels of question placement, and two
list orders. In the Interspersed Questions condition, subjects received
a single booklet in which each story was followed by the test on that story.
In the Questions-After condition, subjects read the stories in one booklet
and then went on to the test in a separate booklet. In all other details,
the method was the same as in Experiment I.
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Results and Discussion
Once again, no effects involving list order were found and the analyses
were collapsed across that factor. Two-way (C-After and C-Before X Questions-
After and Interspersed Questions) between-subjects analyses of variance were
carried out with combined frequency of errors (B-Mention plus B-Incorrect),
frequency of B-Mention errors, and the conditional probability of B-Incorrect
errors given a correct B-Mention response as dependent variables.
In the total error analysis, all effects were significant. More errors
were made in C-After than C-Before, F(1,20) = 14.31, < .001 (means and
standard deviations for all the dependent variables are found in Table 2).
More errors were made in the Questions After than in the Interspersed
Insert Table 2 about here
Questions conditions, F(1,20) = 5.91, p < .025. Most important, the inter-
action was significant, F(1,20) = 4.67, p < .05. Looking at simple effects,
significantly more errors were made in the C-After than the C-Before con-
ditions only in the Questions-After condition (F(1,20) = 17.67, p< .001
for Questions-After; F(1,20) = 1.31, p > .25 for Interspersed Questions).
Also, significantly more errors were made in the Questions-After than in
the Interspersed Questions condition for C-After subjects but not for C-Before
subjects (F(1,20) = 10.53, p < .005 for C-After; F < 1 for C-Before). These
results clearly militate against the corrected representations hypothesis.
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With frequency of B-Mention errors as the dependent variable, the
C-Position effect was significant and the other two effects were marginally
significant (see Table 2). More errors were made in the C-After than in
the C-Before conditions, F(1,20) = 13.19, p < .005. In Experiment I, the
same trend occurred but the difference was not statistically significant.
More errors tended to be made in the Questions-After that in the Interspersed
Questions condition, F(1,20) - 3.57, p < .075. The interaction also approached
significance F(1,20) = 3.57, p < .075. Simple effects analyses indicated more
errors in the C-After than in the C-Before conditions only in the Questions-
After condition (F(1,20) = 15.23, p < .001 for Questions After; F(1,20) =
1.52, p > .10 for Interspersed Questions). More errors were made with Ques-
tions-After than with Interspersed Questions only for the C-After condition
(F(1,20) = 7.13, < .025 for C-After; F < I for C-Before).
Finally, all effects were significant with the conditional probability
of a B-Incorrect error given a correct B-Mention response as the dependent
variable (see Table 2). An unweighted means analysis was used because the
conditional probability was undefined (denominator equal to zero) for one
subject in the C-After/Questions-After condition. B-Incorrect errors were
more likely to be made in the C-After than in the C-Before conditions,
F(1,19) = 5.04, < .04, and in the Questions-After than in the Interspersed
Questions conditions, F(1,19) = 6.26, p <.0 2 5. The interaction was again
significant, F(1,19) = 4.65, < .05. The results of the simple effects
analyses paralleled those with the other two dependent variables. Errors
were more likely in the C-After than in the C-Before conditions only in the
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Questions-After condition (F(1,19) = 9.24, p < .01 for Questions After;
F < 1 for Interspersed Questions). Errors were more likely with Questions-
After than with Interspersed Questions only for the C-After condition
(F(1,19) = 10.62, P < .005 for C-After; F < 1 for C-Before). Again, the
results strongly conflict with the predictions of the immediately-corrected-
representation hypothesis.
The results of Experiment II replicated those of Experiment I. Further-
more, they demonstrate that the C-After effect is not due to changing a stored
representation of the B information (the explicit inference).
General Discussion
The present experiments demonstrated that inferences presented in text
are superficially processed and tend to have very unstable representations
in semantic memory, if they are represented at all. Various alternative
hypotheses were discredited. Such a conclusion is troublesome for many
current structural approaches to discourse comprehension and memory (e.g.,
Meyer, 1975). All semantic information presented in text, including explicit
(as well as some implicit) inferences, is supposed to receive an internal
representation. The present experiments create doubts about such claims.
It might beargued that the inferences in the present experiment (the B in-
formation) lacked structural importance; I.e., they were low in the hierar-
chical text representations, thereby explaining the poor memory performance.
Such an argument accounts for omissions better than it does the prevalence of
remembering the opposite of what was presented. Furthermore, such an argu-
ment seems to reconceptualize structural importance. In conventional
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conceptualizations, the B information in the present experiments should have
the same location in a text hierarchy whether the C information comes before
or after; the stories contain the same content in both conditions. Further-
more, the B information tended to be central. Rather, it might be argued
that predictable information is less "important" in the sense that one need
not pay as much attention to it. This sense of importance accounts for the
present data but extant discourse structure theories do not provide for
importance variations on such a dimension. Clearly, such theories provide
no basis for predicting the differential memory for implied information found
in the present study.
The present experiments further our understanding of the processes in-
volved in accommodative reconstruction (discussed in the introduction).
Spiro (1977) proposed a heuristic model, the State of Schema (SOS) model,
to account for the processes involved in accommodative reconstruction. One
of the questions addressed by the SOS model was how subjects could be so sure
they had read what they had not read. The answer proposed was that much of
what is read is predictable. When predictable information is encountered,
it is taken for granted and passed over. If needed later, it could be derived
from whatever other information made it predictable. Perhaps some kind of
fast-fading "left-to-be-derived" marker is attached to information that would
be the basis for generating the superficially processed predictable information.
In any case, subjects would know (at least tacitly) that memory tends to be
incomplete, with derivable information missing. When readily retrieved in-
formation at recall is insufficient to produce a coherent view of the past,
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the assumption is made that the lack of coherence is attributable to the
absence of superficially processed derivable information. That information
would then be generated, even though it may never have been presented. The
crucial assumption in this account, i.e., predictable information is super-
ficially processed and not stably represented in memory, has been validated
in the present experiments. Briefly digressing, it remains for further in-
vestigation to determine whether the sensitivity to opportunities for super-
ficial processing, a kind of "semantic automaticity," may be a prerequisite
of skilled reading absent in less able readers.
Finally, the present experiments provided further evidence for accommo-
dative reconstruction itself. When subsequent information retroactively
affected the coherence of previously comprehended information, errors in
recall in the direction of enhancing coherence were evident. The accommo-
dation was sometimes active, as in remembering (with high confidence) the
opposite of what occurred (e.g., the block did not break), and was sometimes
passive, as in saying nothing was mentioned (e.g., about whether the block
broke).
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Table 1
Error Frequency as a Function of Condition
and Error Type in Experiment I
B-Mention plus
B-Incorrect
3.8 (1.32)
2.2 (1.62)
3.1 (1.25)
B-Mention
2.6 (1.43)
1.9 (1.52)
2.8 (1.25)
Probability of
B-Incorrect given
correct on B-Mention
.21 (.15)
.08 (.11)
.06 (.10)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. The maximum possible
error frequency is 8.
Condition
C-After
C-Before
No-C
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Table 2
Error Frequency as a Function of C-Position,
Question-Placement, and Error Type in Experiment II
Condition
Question After
C-After
C-Before
Interspersed
Questions
C-After
C-Before
B-Mention plus
B-Incorrect
5.3 (2.58)
1.7 (1.03)
2.5 (1.05)
1.5 (0.55)
B-Mention
4.5 (2.26)
1.3 (1.03)
2.3 (1.03)
1.3 (0.82)
Probability of
B-Incorrect given
correct on B-Mention
.39 (.379)
.05 (.074)
.03 (.068)
.02 (.052)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. The maximum possible
error frequency is 8.
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